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ABSTRACT TheNationalScienceAdvisoryBoardforBiosecurity(NSABB)’srecommendationtorestrictpublicationofthedetails
ofthegenerationofmammalian-transmissibleH5N1inﬂuenzavirusisunprecedented.Dual-useconsiderationsindicatedthat
thepotentialbiosecurityrisksofatransmissibleH5N1viruswithapossiblemortalityof50%inhumansoutweighthesubstan-
tialbeneﬁtsofopenandcompletescientiﬁcexchangeinthiscase,althoughthebeneﬁtsincludepotentialearlydetectionstrate-
giesforH5N1viruseswithspeciﬁcgeneticmarkersandcontrolstrategies,includingdevelopmentofantiviralsandvaccines.Itis
arguedthatboththefundingagency(theNationalInstituteofAllergyandInfectiousDiseases)andthescientistswererespond-
ingtosocietalneedsandactedentirelyresponsibly.Thesestudiesusherinaneweraforlifesciences,compellingtheresearch
communitytoconfrontimportantdecisions:underwhatconditionsshouldsuchresearchbedone?Howcantheprincipleoffull
releaseofinformationbebalancedwiththemoralimperativetoprotectthepublichealth?
T
hemajorityofbiologicalscientistsaresurprisinglyunawareof
dual-use research and the role of the U.S. National Science
Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), although inﬂuenza re-
searchers did know that a review board had recommended publi-
cation of Jeffrey Taubenberger’s complete sequence of the 1918
Spanish inﬂuenza virus (1, 2), despite potential biosecurity risks.
Consequently, authors and journals alike were surprised by the
NSABB’srecommendationthatthefulldetailsofthegenerationof
mammalian-transmissible H5N1 inﬂuenza virus be withheld.
Why the apparent reversal in policy? Why does the risk of pub-
lishingthedetailsofH5N1transmissibilityinmammalsoutweigh
the beneﬁts of disseminating important new information of im-
mense human and veterinary public health importance?
The reasons include the greater lethality of H5N1 inﬂuenza
(50%) than of Spanish inﬂuenza (2.5%) in humans, the avail-
abilityofhighlypathogenicH5N1virusesinnature,andthenearly
universal susceptibility of humans to H5N1 infection. This com-
bination of factors creates an unacceptably high level of risk to
humanity should mammalian-transmissible H5N1 virus be acci-
dentally or intentionally released. To cope with this dilemma, the
NSABB recommended publication of revised manuscripts that
withheldsomeofthedetails.Afullmanuscriptwouldbeprepared
for distribution to global health ofﬁcials on a need-to-know basis
after further consideration and planning.
Both the Fouchier and Kawaoka groups used the ferret model
to demonstrate mammalian transmissibility of highly pathogenic
H5N1 virus. While the ferret is considered the best available
model of human inﬂuenza virus infection and transmission, we
do not know whether the ferret fully recapitulates these events in
humans. For one thing, H5N1 infection tends to be milder in
ferretsthaninhumans;onlyaminorityofH5N1strainsarelethal
in ferrets, whereas lethality greater than 50% has been docu-
mented in humans. Thus, while we cannot conﬁdently equate
transmissibilityandpathogenicityofinﬂuenzavirusinferretsand
humans, can we afford to disregard data from the best available
model?
Concern has been expressed that the agency funding the re-
search (the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
[NIAID])andthetwogroupsofscientistsconductingtheresearch
on H5N1 inﬂuenza transmissibility may have acted irresponsibly
(3). However, after the 1997 emergence of H5N1 inﬂuenza in
humans,withitsgreaterthan50%lethalityanditspotentialtrans-
missibility from avians to humans, both the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) (4) and a Blue Ribbon Panel of inﬂuenza re-
searchadviserstoNIAIDassertedthatfurtherH5N1researchwas
necessary (5). One of the research recommendations of the 2009
WHO Public Health Research Agenda for Inﬂuenza was to “In-
vestigate virus-speciﬁc factors associated with zoonotic and pan-
demicpotential(e.g.,infectivity,transmissibility,andpathogenic-
ity).” In 2006, the Blue Ribbon Panel on Inﬂuenza Research
recommended to NIAID that “Learning more about how inﬂu-
enza viruses circulate between animal reservoirs and about the
evolutionary pressures that lead to the emergence and spread of
newviralsubtypes—especiallythefactorsthatfavortransmission
fromanimalstohumans—areurgentresearchpriorities.”Unfor-
tunately, neither the Blue Ribbon Panel nor WHO addressed the
question of dual-use research. The focus was on the beneﬁts of
knowledge, including the development of better control strate-
gies, such as novel antivirals and vaccines. Now that researchers
have generated mammalian-transmissible H5N1 and the U.S.
NSABB has raised the dual-use concern, there is a clear and ac-
knowledgedneedforfulldiscussionofthewayforward.WHOhas
also raised considerable concern about the risk of developing
mammalian-transmissible H5N1 viruses.
The two manuscripts formally demonstrating generation of
mammalian-transmissible H5N1 inﬂuenza virus make major
contributions to our knowledge and usher in a new era in the life
sciences. The question before the scientiﬁc community is how to
preserve scientiﬁc openness while minimizing risk to the public.
Control strategies for inﬂuenza and other emerging diseases are
not adequately developed; the Fineberg Report on the evaluation
of WHO’s response to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic (6) emphasized
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pandemic or to any similarly global, sustained and threatening
public health emergency.” The urgent need for general guidance
in this matter is reminiscent of the dilemma addressed at the Asi-
lomar conference on recombinant DNA molecules in 1975 (7).
One possibility is to involve the national academies of science
fromallinterestedcountriesandWHOinconsideringthetopicof
dual-use research and an approach that both promotes research
and maintains biosecurity. It has been argued that suppression of
information serves no purpose, as the information will inevitably
be “leaked.” Although this viewpoint is likely correct, I do not
believe we should publish the detailed methods of preparing
transmissible H5N1.
Further, we must consider and establish the biosecurity level
needed for future work on transmissible H5N1. Because highly
pathogenic H5N1 is enzootic in multiple regions of Eurasia, the
use of biosecurity level 4 (BSL4) for all H5N1 research would
markedly restrict advancement of knowledge needed for vaccine
and antiviral research. Enhancing BSL3 biosecurity with elec-
tronic surveillance, advanced personal protective equipment
(PPE), and prior dual-use assessment of proposed studies is a
possibility for further consideration. It is noteworthy that in the
United States there were 395 biosecurity breaches involving select
agents and 7 laboratory-acquired infections during 2003 to 2009
(8).Theseincidents,whichoccurredinbothBL3andBL4labora-
tories, highlight the potential risks and the need to fully consider
improvedbiosecurityandtheimmunizationofstaffwithregularly
updated H5N1 vaccines.
The groundbreaking manuscripts by the Fouchier and
Kawaoka groups will be of great interest to life scientists and will
no doubt increase their familiarity with the concept of dual-use
research. These two reports challenge us to take action to ensure
that research and open dissemination of knowledge can be safe-
guarded without compromising biosecurity. Both causes are fun-
damentally important, but public safety must not be compro-
mised. While bioterrorism is of real concern, nature has the
potential to do much greater damage.
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